Universality of Science : Historical Validation of a Philosophical Idea by Paty, Michel
Universality of Science : Historical Validation of a
Philosophical Idea
Michel Paty
To cite this version:
Michel Paty. Universality of Science : Historical Validation of a Philosophical Idea. Habib, S.
Irfan and Raina, Dhruv. Situating the history of science : Dialogues with Joseph Needham,
Oxford India Paperbacks, p. 303-324, 2001. <halshs-00184932>
HAL Id: halshs-00184932
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00184932
Submitted on 3 Nov 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Chap 12, in Habib, S. Irfan and Raina, Dhruv (eds.), Situating the history of science : Dialogues 
with Joseph Needham, Oxford University Press (New Delhi), 1999, p. 303-324 (Oxford India 
Paperbacks, 2001). (Trad. en anglais, par M.P. Original français : 1997f, 1999c).  
 
Universality of Science :Historical 
Validation of a Philosophical Idea A  
 
by 
 
MICHEL PATYB  
 
SUMMARY.-  
 The question of the universality of science is considered, in contemporary 
debates, under the most varied and opposed positions depending whether one is 
sharing the point of view of an "ideal science" or that of a "social production of 
science". In the first case, science is conceived as the "hard core" of its statements 
and results at the period under consideration, and its supposed universality 
ignores factors that relativize its contents of knowledge, and which can be of a 
conceptual as well as a social nature. Conversely, an exclusive focalization on the 
social aspects of the production of scientific knowledge ignores the objective 
character of these knowledge contents, be they either thought objects such as 
mathematical ones, or phenomena of the real, physico-biological as well as 
human and social, world. These two extreme positions, although caricatural, are 
shared by many. They illustrate the absence or ignorance of interdisciplinar 
analyse between philosophy, the various sciences, history of sciences and general 
history. 
 We shall first evoke very briefly elements of the critique set against the 
universality of science as they stand nowadays from inquiries of philosophy of 
knowledge, sociology of knowwledge, history of science, history and 
anthropology. Then we shall try to set philosophically the problem of the 
universality of science as a philosophical idea, strongly linked to science and to 
philosophy since their genesis. We shall see, by following the idea at various 
stages of the history of thought, that the philosophical statement of universality of 
science has to be confronted with the historical reality of the production, diffusion 
and assimilation or appropriation of scientific knowledge, always specifying the 
various dimensions of that one (which include its applications and its links to 
                                                 
a Paper presented at the International Conference Science the Refreshing River. On the History of 
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techniques and to technology). 
MICHEL PATY  UNIVERSALITY OF SCIENCE : A PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA TO THE PROOF OF HISTORY 3 
 
 
1 
 
THE NEED FOR A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS.` 
 
 
 
 The problem of universality of science is considered, in contemporary 
debates, under the most varied and opposed positions depending whether one is 
sharing the point of view of an "ideal science" or that of a "social production of 
science". In the first case, science is conceived as the "hard core" of its statements 
and results at the period under consideration, and its supposed universality ignores 
factors that relativize its contents of knowledge, and which can be of a conceptual 
as well as a social nature. Conversely, an exclusive focalization on the social 
aspects of the production of scientific knowledge ignores the objective character 
of these knowledge contents, be they either thought objects such as mathematical 
ones, or phenomena of the real, physico-biological as well as human and social, 
world. These two extreme positions, although caricatural, are shared by many. 
They illustrate the absence or ignorance of interdisciplinar analyse between 
philosophy, the various sciences, history of sciences and general history. 
 It is true to say, as we all are conscious, that science is not only a set of 
knowledge, ruled by the judgements of reason and of experience. Science is also 
involved in a cultural and axiological context, and stands on values that are 
commonly accepted by the culture in which it takes place. But science is also an 
activity and includes, as such, its practices, that are socialized ones or even 
directly social practices. Science contains also its applications which have 
consequences on the transformations of society, and these transformations have a 
direct retro-effect on science itself. Science, technology and society are closely 
related, and contemporary science is often considered as "technoscience", a 
concept invented to express this complexity.  
 To-day science is inseparably the system of science and technology, in 
which the two dimensions I mentioned previously also take part, science as 
content of knowledge and science as practice. The fact that, when we speak of 
science, a system is at stake means that we are compelled to consider that the very 
notion of science means indissociation between knowledge as content and the 
concrete situations in which it is embedded. This means that, even if we would 
consider only the epistemological dimension of science, that is science as a type of 
thinking, we would have to consider the possibility of these effects or 
consequences as virtual properties of such a type of thinking. This expresses 
nothing else than the following evidence : human thinking, whatever be the form 
under which we consider it, carries with itself the virtuality of man's practices, 
actions and sociality. 
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 At every period of history, and in every cultural area, science, or its 
equivalent, is embedded in a cultural totality of an organic nature and constituting 
by itself a system. This systemic character makes difficult to conceive the 
possibility of transmission of a state of science and of culture to another one, be 
such transmission considered either in space at a given period, or in time along the 
flow of history : out of their systems, the elements that constitute these systems 
undergo a shift of meaning. Hence the difficulty of the question of transmission, 
which, as I shall try to show, is at the heart of the question of universality. 
 This state of affairs is eventually taken as an excuse by those who 
consider that the debate on the universality of science is closed, because it is 
strictly related with the claim of universality made by the "western-positive-
technological" conception of science. Those who share this conception consider 
that to-day science, “world science”, is the only universal science, and they would 
deny any other and further consideration. One could however object that 
“universality” meant in that way is not necessarily a feature of this science, but 
has been imposed by an economical mode of domination related systemically with 
the power of technology.  
 On the contrary, radical opponents to this “imperialist” conception of 
science would deny any value to the notion of universality of science, precisely 
because of this systemic solidarity between science and domination. But they 
ignore that systems evolve and that elements taken from within a structure can be 
transferred to another structure without disappearing. In such a case, it will be 
intersting to inquire ourselves about the changes of meaning these elements suffer, 
or, eventually, about some permanencies that can be observed through the process 
of transmission. And, indeed, if translation is treatery, it might well, for this very 
reason, endow some creative effects. 
 With this in mind, we can wonder whether there is not, in the case of 
"universality of science", something that resists the strong criticisms that have 
been opposed to it. I am sure that Joseph Needham - who wrote an admirable 
meditation on the historian of science as an œcumenical man1 - would not have 
liked to leave up the idea of universality of science, for it would mean at the same 
time to leave up the idea that science is value, and deprive us from one of our 
means - tools or arms -, to act in favour of the enlightenment and accomplishment 
of mankind. And it thus would make us leave the place for the benefit of growing 
obscurantisms and fundamentalisms. But, for sure, we have to question science 
and the idea of its universality, in order to understand better what kind of reality 
and effectiveness these notions have. 
 I shall take as my point of departure, in this intended critical analysis 
and reconstruction, the state of criticism, now rather known, corresponding 
essentially to : 1) reflections on the insertion of science in the industrial and 
capitalistic society (see, for instance, the works of Max Weber, of Jurgen 
                                                 
1 Needham [1993].  
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Habermas, of Jacques Ellul, among many other); and 2) reflections on the link 
between science and imperialism, which have been growing during the last two 
decades and of which the studies on "Science and Empires" are a part.   
 Admitting these analyse and criticisms as known, I shall try, in what 
follows, to develop some elements of argumentation which are more a call for 
further thematical investigations than mere statements or conclusions. For, I think, 
the question of universality of science is primarily a question about the nature of 
science, science as we consider it nowadays, but also science as it has been in the 
past. And, about this, our knowledge is far from being close : we discover new 
dimensions and aspects of science that shed more light on the question of its 
universality. 
 For all these reasons, we can see that this question is twofold : on one 
side it is, undoubtedly, a philosophical question, and it must be considered with a 
philosophical mind. But we cannot, as closed philosophical systems would do, 
consider that philosophy by itself can give the answer. For science is - besides any 
attempt of definition - a reality, a historical, intellectual and social, reality, and 
only by historical investigation can we hope to grasp something of its reality - 
through its evolutions. The same can be said about the idea of its universality, the 
meaning of which has evolved through the centuries. 
 At this stage, we would propose that universality of science is a 
philosophical question submitted to the proof of history. 
 We shall dedicate now some time to the philosophical point of view ; 
then, we shall adopt a historical point of view, which will be centered around two 
considerations : history and anthropology on one hand, history of science as a 
history of transmissions on the other hand. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
THE POINT OF VIEW 
OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 The program I propose to consider is the following : look for the 
founding concepts of the idea of universality concerning science, to see whether 
our criticisms let us in the end some sound elements that fit with our intelligibility 
requirements. Then, inquire into history - general, cultural and anthropological 
history -, and into history of science, to see whether a concept of universality can 
be reconstructed from such elements that would be better suited with real and 
living science. 
 I shall restrict myself, for this investigation, to the philosophical 
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tradition of Mediterranean and Western world that is usually considered to begin 
with ancient Greeks. In doing so, I let aside other origins of our modern science, 
thus calling for complementations about the foundations of science and 
philosophical ideas in other cultures that have been influent on the constitution of 
present modern science. For Greek culture is only one of the origins of our present 
conception of science.  
 Our notion of science, and modern science itself, have one of their 
main roots in the founding moment of the birth of science and philosophy, in old 
Greece, when the ideas about the world, that is cosmology, underwent a crucial 
transformation from mythos to physis, from mythological descriptions about the 
creation of the world and the order of nature to natural ones, organized through 
reasoning2. A new form of thinking was thus appearing : it would develop from 
these “positive” thinking of the old Ionians and from another current of abstract 
thinking thus appearing with Parmenide and the Eleates and which, from Socrate 
to Plato, asked about the deep truth and the real being that hide themselves under 
mere appearence and change of nature. They established the logos as the principle 
of rational thought, together with the requirement of intelligibility, which refers to 
the idea of being3. Aristotle would explicitate the role of the Logos as the series, 
endowed with a meaning, of the words having a meaning, which led him to 
emphasize the idea of demonstration. It is this logos  that makes the difference, 
according to him, between man and animal4.  
 In the conception of the Logos  as developed by Greek philosophy - 
although not so much in Aristotle, who favoured logics-, the role of mathematical 
thinking is emphasized, due to the mathematical method of reasoning that 
overcomes the approximations of discourse in ordinary language and to its ability 
to serve as a model, because of its ideal objects that make possible to relate, 
through rigourous logical reasoning, the one and the multiple, the identical and the 
varied, by referring one to each other the elements of geometrical figures.  
 The logos  verifies permanently the validity of established meanings : 
in other words, any uttering asks for its own criticism. This function of the logos 
is, at the same time, and for this very reason, claim of universality, whose idea 
was being born with it.  
 The conception of science inherited from Greeks, even if it has been 
modified - in particular through the adjunction of the notion of experience and the 
experimentation procedure -, is hencefore closely linked to the ideas of 
universality, of reason, of philosophy.  
 The close link between the coming up of the philosopher and the 
advent of the citizen5 is worth to be emphazised, for these ideas arose, as a matter 
                                                 
2 Cornford [1912, 1952], quoted and discussed by Vernant [1965].  
3 Vernant [1965], 1985 ed., p. 383.  
4 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, chapter 2. Cf. Labarrière (1994). 
5 Vernant [1965], 1985 ed., p. 392.  
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of fact, together with the rational mode of arguing that dialogue is, in this peculiar 
society ruled by democracy - in  a way, these ideas are an emanation of this 
society. Rational dialogue is, in this sense, a formalization of that social invention 
of the Greek city, democracy. But, should we add, it not only formalizes it but 
transcends it, for its further fecundity would overpass the limits inherent to this 
first form of democacy towards a more "universal" widening which will go along 
with the idea of humanity (or mankind) - still a very restrictive idea at Greeks' 
time. 
 Because of this “social origin”, the idea of universality, together with 
those of reason, of science and of wisdom (sophia), all pretending to transcend, 
through the notions of being and of truth, the circumstances that gave birth to 
them, these ideas cannot, indeed, escape criticism.  
 But we are aware that the contingency of circumstances does not 
forbid - on the contrary it can possibly make it manifest - the universality of some 
human dispositions such as art, symbolisation, ability to make objects and to 
technics, religious feeling and metaphysics, the demand for meaning, and the 
capacity of rationality is one of such dispositions. It remains hencefore our task to 
question this rationality, its content, its evolution and its effects, under the point of 
view, precisely, of universality.  
 Let us keep, from all that, that the idea of universality, as well as the 
ideas of reason and of demonstrative (and even objective) science, with which it 
has a constitutive link, carries with it the requirement of its own criticism. In this, 
it would show particularly adequate, in its principle, when one would aim at 
overcoming the limitations of a local culture, or at making possible a 
communication between cultures. 
 This idea was enrooting and, so to speak, "universalizing" itself still 
more with regards to the conditions of its origin. The story would be long to tell : 
there were numerous centuries of maturation where philosophy, religion and 
theology, sciences, and social transformations as well, were in close interaction. 
 I shall only mention the affirmation of universality of the faculty of 
judgement, that seems to be well established between European Renaissance and 
eighteenth century. It is well expressed by Descartes' words in the opening of his 
Discourse of the Method : “The power of judging well and of distinguishing the 
true from the wrong, that is poperly what we call good sense or reason, is by 
nature equal in all men”. Worth of emphasis is also the strong ties it holds with 
the possibility of a universal doubt6. With Descartes, doubt is founding of a 
knowledge that is to be, at the same time, and for this very reason, universal. Here 
something quite new sprang up : the only true knowledge is that knowledge that, 
for every thinking subject, overcomes the obstacles opposed by doubt.  
 The great lesson from Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii - 
Rules for the guiding of the mind -, a lesson that was to be somehow 
                                                 
6 Descartes [1637a], first part (my emphasis, M.P.).  
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underestimated by positive science that would develop after his time, is that there 
is no knowledge and science if not through subjectivity, which is the proper place 
of intelligibility. Every mind, every subjectivity founds in itself its understanding 
and its judgements, and keeps in itself the ability of getting at truth without any 
need to refer to any authority.  
  I said that posterior science was to silence somehow this lesson, and to 
prefer keeping the one of man's power on nature. But philosophies would 
generally maintain something of the idea. Kant's philosophy, for instance, re-
established against the critiques of empirism the demand of reason by gifting the 
transcendantal subject with sensibility and understanding, that make knowledge 
possible by allowing him to organize rationally his experience of phenomena. It 
took, however, science as it was given, aiming at justifying it but without 
considering as a possibility an eventual future recasting.  
 As to Descartes's project to found a science that is certain, if it has 
been effective only with geometrie, and mainly failed for the rest, its inspiration is 
to be found in his philosophy, notably in his Meditations, where he proposed to 
look back to the ego cogito  as the first evidence, eventually able to provide an 
absolute foundation to knowledge7. Edmund Husserl was to see in it the 
instauration of "a new type of philosophy", in which “naïve objectivism is 
replaced by transcendantal subjectivism” (see Husserl's Cartesian Meditations8). 
This universal science was, for Husserl, philosophy itself, such as it is considered 
by phenomenology. To found knowledge, the philosopher must take everything 
again to his own account : “Philosophy, he said, is a personal affair of the 
philosopher”, “it must be constituted as his own, be his wisdom, his knowledge 
that, although its tends towards universal, is acquired by himself and that he must 
be able to justify since the start and at each of its stages”9.  
 Let us forget this particular philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology : I 
only wanted to mention the resonance of this perspective with the question of the 
criticism and of the eventual refoundation of the universality of science. Its claim 
begins with a radical questioning on everything that we believe to be evident or 
certain, and this questioning is done in a decidedly fundamental way, as a coming 
back to thought as such10, to the subject as being the place and the condition of 
thought, actor andwarrant of any possible knowledge : this subject of knowledge, 
that is truly at the heart of the question of its universality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Descartes [1641]. 
8 Husserl [1934], 1992 ed., p. 21.  
9 See also Husserl [1954]. 
10 See Groethuysen [1995], pp. 127-134. 
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3 
 
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
AND OF ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 
 
 The notion of universality that, from the point of view of philosophy, 
we have seen going along with that of reason, goes along, from the point of view 
of history, with the notion of mankind, "the coming of which is very recent and 
limited in expansion”, as Claude Levi-Strauss recalls us in his admirable small 
book Race and history11.  
 The idea of mankind, overtaking the narrow frontiers of the tribe or of 
the city so as to embrace the whole of human beings, have be formed 
progressively, in the Mediterranean and Western world, from Greek philosophy 
and monotheist religions - not without episodical backward steps, the recent forms 
of retrogradation beeing racism and the various ethnocentrisms in present time. 
The notion of mankind, of universality of the humane, owes undoubtedly much to 
judaism and to christianism. I am too much ignorant about non-western 
philosophies, but I remind that Joseph Needham asked for the need to investigate 
what form the idea of mankind and of its unity had for instance in Confucean 
thought12. The same should also be done with the teachings of Buddhism. 
 Something was still missing however, in the cultural area of Western 
Europe in the finishing Middle Age, to this notion of mankind: the sense of its 
exact relationship with nature, of its situation in the Universe. It was required, to 
adquire it, to challenge the divinity insofar as this last standed as a closed 
thinking, and this came with the opening of the skies, with the foreseen possibility 
of man's freedom. It might not have been by mere chance that the last restrictions 
against universality of the humane fell at the same time as the rigid spheres of the 
old cosmos did break out.  
 Let us jump, in our evocation, from the humanism of European 
Renaissance and from the new vison of the world symbolized by the names of 
Nicolas Copernic, Giordano Bruno et Galileo Galilei, up to eighteenth century, 
with its great travellers, whose relations speak of the encounter of man with man, 
and with its blossoming of thinkers of Enlightenment - from Giambatista Vico to 
Charles Secondat de Montesquieu and to Giambatista Beccaria, from Jean-
Jacques Rousseau to Denis Diderot and M.J. Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet -, 
elaborating anthropological, philosophical and juridical conceptions that proclaim 
the equality in right of all men on the Earth. The first article of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of the 1789 French Revolution acknowledges this 
                                                 
11 Lévi-Strauss [1952], p. 21. 
12 Needham [1993]. 
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irreversible adcquisition of human thinking, beginning with : “All men are born 
free and equal in right…”. 
 At the same time mankind was admitted as a conscious reality, and 
maybe as an effect of it, people became aware of the great variety of human 
cultures, incomparably more varied than races or ethnies.13. Levi-Strauss observes 
that cultures - and languages as well - which have a same origin tend to diversify 
one from the others, while, on the contrary, those which have different origins 
develop common caracters by which they seem to converge. He underlines also 
that any human people and culture, be it a known or an ignored one, be it 
considered as an evoluated or a “primitive” one, lets behind it a history that is as 
long as the others ones. Some of these histories are cumulatives, for complex, 
always cirumstancial,  reasons; there happened to be interactions, influences and 
borrowings between them, that we cannot simplify according to a linear course 
decided in fonction of the progress of a single one. 
 On the long duration that extends from prehistory up to us, we register 
the marks of neolithic revolution, which shows all the characteristics of 
universalization by its contagion to all the peoples on the Earth, and also the 
marks of further important transformations of which the most recents are the 
scientific and the industrial revolutions, whose propagation seems akin to 
something universal from the facts although, it has been suggested, possibly more 
through effects of coercition than of free choice. Through these transformations, 
anyhow, progress neither appears to be a necessary occurence, neither is it a 
continous change. As we look at it, progress seems to proceed through jumps and 
mutations, through changes of orientation. We could possibly apply to its jerky 
and aleatory but in any case unavoidable motions, the metaphor of the 
transforming breaks of plate tectonics : in the end, some displacement lets be 
shown, visible upon the duration of time, that we call progress. Yet we would 
have to discuss from which variables this judgement is stated. Anyhow, the fact 
remains:  from a given point of view, that depends on variables and of values 
pertaining to our culture, progress of scientific and technical knowledge lets itself 
be stated.  
 The idea of progress, stemming from the accumulation or summing up 
of knowledges, is inherent to our conception of science, and it is tied with the 
critical function of reason, constitutive of science. However, the cumulative 
aspect of knowledges that underlies this stated progress, notwithstanding its 
objective character, is relative : it has to do, so to speak, if we look at it closely, 
with the projection on one axis only of the various components of a culture. 
“Modern culture” gives privilege to the axis that measures scientific development. 
Other cultures give privilege to other, different, axes. 
 What makes the originality of each of these cultures sits “in its 
particular way to solve problems, to put values in perspective, problems and 
                                                 
13 Lévi-Strauss [1959]. 
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values that are approximately the same for all men : for all men without exception 
possess language, techniques, art, knowledges of scientific type, religious beliefs, 
social, economical and political organzation”14. These characters can also 
manifest themselves in predispositions to some genuine assimilation of elements 
originated in a different culture, through the development of particular abilities 
that may eventually create new forms of thinking or new practices. All cultures 
proceed with the inheritance from passed generations and through 
communications with other cultures ; a part of common patrimony may eventually 
be rediscovered through a process of differenciation-unification that is 
characteristic, generally, of the relations between cultures. 
 One of these cultures, the so-called “western culture” (in fact, a bunch 
of cultures, the origin of which is not only western), has generated industrial 
revolution and also contemporary science with its particular meaning, its own 
cultural value. It has spread over the world, a situation not unprecedented if we 
think of prehistory with neolithical revolution, and of the beginning of history 
with the invention and the diffusion of writing.  
 Downstream the centuries which follow these instaurations, the 
question of knowing where exactly they have appeared is of a secundary and even 
anecdotic interest, when compared with the fundamental fact that all cultures 
caught these rather quickly for their own sake and assimilated them - through 
transformations from their original forms. The place where neolithical revolution 
took place is finally of little importance as all human cultures have been able to 
make it their own. Similarly, what importance, Levi-Strauss observed, to know in 
which culture industrial and scientific revolution began ? The simultaneous 
coming out of the same technological overthrow followed by social upheaval in 
societies having accepted it show that these modifications did not hold to the 
peeculiarity of the genius of a culture, but “to conditions that are so general that 
they are located outside the consciousness of men”15. Such “revolutions” are not 
limited to the modalities of their coming out : they are got to take new forms, to 
which all cultures on the inhabited Earth will take part, whatever the conditions.  
 Given this background panel, we would have to evoke the 
circumstances by which, in history, modern science has constituted itself in 
correlation with the idea of its universality. In the gross lines this history is 
known. The essential idea I shall retain from it is that the representations given by 
science appear to us more and more explicitly as constructions.  
 To admit that science and, up to a certain point, reason itself, is built - 
beyond a more immediate function of rationality  -, does not affect its universality 
in right, that is its potentiality to expand. In a given cultural environment, these 
rational elements have been progressively elaborated, woven by the threads 
endlessly intertwinned of experience and of understanding, molding and filling 
                                                 
14 Lévi-Strauss [1959]. 
15 Lévi-Strauss [1959], p. 50.  
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with substance the frame in which they are taken. But their universality might still 
be only a partial and a restricted one, relative to this culture where they were born. 
Their universality will be in a position to be safely stated only if these elements 
resist confrontation - on the level of knowledge, and not as resulting from 
coercitions at other levels that would make them took over, usurpated - with other 
elements originated in other cultures : or, if they feed themselves with these other 
elements, getting at a larger universality. 
 
 
 
4 
 
SCIENCE : A HISTORY 
OF TRANSMISSIONS 
 
 
 
 In their variety (variety of their objects and of their methods), and in 
their diachrony, sciences never ceased to feed one another, ensuing subsequent 
changes in their nature and renewing themselves. It is a lesson of history that 
when a “science” becomes rigid and closed in itself, it is doomed to disappear 
from the field of knowledge. It fossilizes, such as astrology and alchemy, living 
sciences yesterday, cultural reliefs today. 
 History of sciences shows also scientific traditions in formation, in a 
given time and in a given place, characterized by given types of problems, of 
approaches of their objects, and of practices. Filiations in works at successive 
periods assess the existence of these traditions, of these schools16. Eventually, 
these last extend to a whole culture : in that sense one speaks of the chinese 
scientific tradition17, of the scientific (mathematical, astronomical, etc.) tradition 
in Arabic language or of Islamic countries18… Transmissions from a tradition to 
another one are observed : from Greeks to Arabs19, from Arabs to Mediterranean 
Europe…  
 Contemporaneous science has resulted from these transfers, from 
these modifications. In particular, if science in the sense me mean today is 
eminently the heir of Greek thinking, of its notions of phusis and of logos, it has 
borrowed also one of its fundamental constitutive components to a different 
source : I mean technics and experimentation, that seem to have been foreign to 
Greek thought of science, notwithstanding the remarkables inventions of Greek 
                                                 
16 Paty [1990], chap. 4. 
17 Needham [1974, 1993].  
18 Rashed [1984, 1986, 1992, 1994].  
19 Rashed [1993], chapter 1. 
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engeneers, mostly developed in the alexandrine period20. And notwithstanding 
also the mechanical works of Archimedes which bear on statics only and which 
still witness the absence, in this culture, of a relationship between theoretical 
thought and practical knowledges, these knowledges being considered as 
belonging to empiria and escaping pure rationality. 
 In the long run, new currents have been formed from various 
preceding traditions, from which they borrow elements which they integrate in an 
original construction, giving birth to new traditions that reveal to be fruitful.  
 Modern science, as it has developed in Europe since Renaissance in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has inherited from science of Greek 
Antiquity, from science in Arabic language and from science of European Middle 
Age, all these scientific traditions being themselves in filiation one to the other, 
although in a non linear manner. And being also indebted to other traditions, such 
as those from the East, through the complex and inumerate exchanges that never 
ceased from Antiquity and Middle Ages to European Renaissance, between East 
and Mediterranean shores and from there to Western Europe, about which too 
little is still known. We know about caravans and trades, about military and 
political conquests, and for sure exchanges of ideas and of knowledges have gone 
along with them : but on these, history is still wanting. In such exchanges, 
openness to difference and novelty from inside a tradition towards other ones is 
indeed a factor that benefits the first and makes it gain in universality. 
 Modern science itself began with an italian period, that culminated, 
with respect to the science of nature, with Galileo ; its second period is referred, 
by the well-known nineteenth-century German historian of physics J. C. 
Poggendorf, to one “where the other peoples of Europe took an always more 
active part”, with British and French sharing the first rank (this second period 
began, according to him, with the foundation of the London Royal Society in 1662 
and the Academie des sciences of Paris in 1666)21. Henceafter the flame divided 
and multiplied, being passed to numerous European countries, and the 
development of the different branches of knowledge occured in the most varied 
directions, science itself taking a new form.  
 One may evoke, in a more “local” manner, a more specific example 
which deserves detailed study, the case of “mathematical physics”, that was 
established in eighteenth century, from its start in the 1730's to its culminating 
point, Joseph Louis Lagrange’s Analytical Mechanics published in 178822. 
Mathematical physics has been formed in the confluence of two directions of 
matematical and physical thought. The first direction was that of the transmission 
and of the developpement of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’ differential and integral 
                                                 
20 See the argumentation of George Thomson against Benjamin Farrington's claim in favour of a 
tight link between the outcoming of reason and a supposed technical progress among Ionian people 
(Farrington [1944], Thomson [1955]). See also Vernant [1965], 1985 ed., pp. 261-322).  
21 Poggendorf [1878], french transl. , p. xii-xiii.    
22 Paty [1994]. 
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calculus, occured around 1700-1720, thanks to Leibniz himself, the Bernoulli 
brothers Johann I and Jacob in Basel, and to people among the mathematical 
milieu of  Paris Academy of Sciences such as Pierre Varignon and Alexis 
Fontaine23. The second direction was that of the transmission of Newtonian 
physics on the continent, among the heirs of the first ones such as Alexis Clairaut, 
Leonhard Euler, Jean d’Alembert, followed in turn by their own successors, 
Lagrange, already named, and Pierre Simon Laplace24. 
 A new so to speak “school” was formed, in a place and in a 
intellectual milieu that differ from those where the initial elaborations took place, 
and this new school happened to open a new branch of science the fecundity of 
which would last nearly one century, after which the flame dispersed and 
lightened again, in other and new places. It is in that sense that theoreticians in 
physics from Germany and North Europe of the second part of nineteenth century, 
that were active in electrodynamics and in thermodynamics, considered 
themselves to be the successors of mathematical and theoretical physics coined by 
Lagrange and Laplace as well as by Jean Baptiste Biot, Joseph Fourier, Siméon 
Denis Poisson, Augustin Fresnel, André Marie Ampère… 
 History of sciences is only made with such examples: it is a history of 
transmissions. The problem of the universality of science might be enlightened, in 
ths respect, from a somewhat similar but more general consideration with respect 
of cultures. Transmissions of a scientific current to another one are indeed 
concerned  by cultural factors, even if the effects of these factors are less 
important inside a given culture considered on a large scale - as it is the case of 
western Europe. 
 This particular form of culture, in which science has such a large part, 
an that had been constituted in the context of the Christian civilization of Middle 
Age, results indeed, in turn, from the confluence of two cultures : “the science of 
the Greeks” and the “Wisdom of the Jews”. Of them, Jean Bottero reminds us, in 
his book Birth of God, that they represent two millenary traditions oriented in two 
very distinct directions. “The science of the Greeks”, he writes, “is the fruit of one 
millenary of progress, of struggles, of refinements and discoveries about 
intellectual reflection. The wisdom of the Jews is the fruit of one millenary of 
progress, of struggles, of refinements and discoveries about religious feeling”25. 
 Let us mention indeed, upstream of both, Babylonian writing that 
allowed both “Greek science” an “Jewish wisdom” to be moulded in their 
respective forms. (And we shall not forget “the admirables achievements of 
Babylonian culture as well as the cultures of the other peoples of Mesopotamy 
that have preceded the Greeks”26 which impregnated them directly). Undeniably 
                                                 
23 Blay [1992], Geenberg [1995]. 
24 Greenberg [1986]. 
25 Bottéro [1992], pp. 31-32.  
26 Needham [1991], pp. 342. 
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writing has contributed to endowe science with genuine properties by which it 
differs from writingless cultures. Consider Mayas’ civilization in Central America 
: it developed well elaborated scientific knowledges in mathematics (they knew 
the zero even before the mathematicians of India, it seems), in astronomy, and 
extremely sophisticated techniques (architecture and town urbanisation, water 
supply in regions distant from rivers and with irregular precipitations…). 
 Let us remind, finally, that the great cultural filiations mentioned 
above, through which scientific traditions that gave rise to nowadays science have 
emerged and developed, are in no way exclusive of other influences, 
underestimated up to know and still often poorly known, but which might well 
have had a  fundamental and decisive character. According to Joseph Needham, 
the openness of the skies claimed by Giordano Bruno and William Gilbert as a 
corollary of Copernican vision, would have benefitted of the knowledge which 
had recently reached in Europe, of Chinese astronomers’ representation of 
celestial bodies, floating inside an infinite space27.  
 For the great historian of Chinese science, the civilizations of China 
and of India play a paper in the emergence of modern science in Europe : he saw 
the ancient scientific currents of the various civilizations as rivers flowing into the 
ocean of modern science”28. In his beautiful meditation entitled “The historian of 
sciences : œcumenical man”29, Joseph Needham expresses his conviction that it is 
necessary to get rid of the europeocentrical feeling of supremacy that is still 
effectve in history of science under the pretext that scientific revolution first 
occured in Europe. The origins of science are multiple, he reminds us, evoking the 
contributions of the various civilizations to the common patrimony of scientific 
knowledges : “By thousands of capillaries, as veines that converge to form a 
major trunk, a big cave vein, influences came from the whole world.” Find orig. 
quotation 
 Collaboration of cultures requires, to be richer, the existence of 
differences between them : monolithism entails frailty, as Claude Levi-Strauss 
advises us in Race and history. “It is”, he writes, “the holy duty of mankind” to 
beware of blind particularism and “also to never forget that no fraction of 
mankind helds from itself formulas that could be applied to the whole, and that 
mankind merged into a unique way of life is just unconceivable, because it would 
be an ossified mankind”30.  
 Therefore universality means to take into account difference from the 
other, and it implies exchange. Needless to say that - considering also the 
construction of the concept that we tried to get back at - universality is not to be 
confused with uniformity and monolithism. We are left henceforth with the 
                                                 
27 Needham [1954-], vol. 3, p. 438 sq.; Needham [1993], p. 132.  
28 Needham [1991], p. 271. 
29 In Needham [1991], pp. 340-348. 
30 Lévi-Strauss [1952], pp. 76-83. 
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problem of communication and exchange, and these are in no way to be taken 
from the model offered to us by present “world civilization” through the media 
business, that is a monologue with loudpeakers. Universality calls for the other 
and requires dialogue. In dialogue, two ore more entities exist (human or cultural), 
each with its own system of reference. 
 Let us say, concerning what we can learn from achievements observed 
through history of sciences, as well as concerning communication of a given 
culture with another one, that a sympathy, and even some kind of “empathy”, is 
needed to enter in the intelligence of another thought, or of another type of 
thought, different from one’s own. The remarks is valid for systems of thought 
distant in time as well as for contemporaneous ones as studied by anthropologists. 
In both cases, what is required is to decentre oneself in order to get in 
communication and recognize the other  as he stands in its own system of thought. 
The universal, if it corresponds to something possible and meaningful, contains 
among its conditions of possibility, recognition. As a corollary, the choice of a 
point of view is not only unavoidable but necessary and demands, for universality 
to be built, the acceptance of difference: it demands to admit the existence of 
other cultures and of other values even of those which on cannot assimilate 
because they are too alien to us or too much in opposition with the values we 
consider essential. Such is the spirit of tolerance. This spirit appears to be a 
genuine feature of a science of a peculiar nature, history, in its approach of its 
object31. 
 I would like, incidentally, to make a remark about the variety of 
scientific traditions and their bonds to culture, a historical reality which should not 
be confused with extremist ideological considerations completely antagonistic to 
the claim for universality. Recent history taught us to which aberrations has led 
the idea that there would exist - with irreducible opposition between them - a 
jewish science and another one, so-called aryan science (actually, a nazist one), or 
a “bourgeois science” as opposed to a “proletarian” one. To believe in something 
like a “imperialistic-capitalistic science” and, on the other side, a “third-world 
science”, eventually an “islamist science”, is nothing but obscurantism, it must be 
stated clearly, and the same holds with respect to reason. Once again, we need not 
exclusion but dialogue, because we are aware that nothing living and progressing 
is closed and isolated from the rest of the world.  
 What is true is that history - and in particular history of sciences - 
teaches us that there was, in the development of human civilizations, a Chinese 
science, an Indian science, a Greek science, a science in Arabic language or of 
Islamic countries, a science of European Christian Middle Age, a science of 
European Renaissance, and henceafter a science called “modern” or “classical”, 
followed by a “contemporary science”. And also other sciences conceived by 
other peoples, in particular those of the ancient civilizations of America. None of 
                                                 
31 It is also a feature of anthropology. 
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these sciences was or is universal - even that one in which we are situated, that is 
“contemporaneous science” -, but, to the extent to which they expressed the 
dimension of man's knowledge - knowledge of nature and of himself -, they all 
aimed at something that does not differ from what we have called universality.  
 I shall not develop here about the eventuality of comparing between 
the claims to universality from various sciences - related, indeed, with 
epistemological features of these sciences that would make them wider in scope 
and more unified, or not. What I want to retain at this stage is that there is, from 
one science to another, some kind of a current of universality, which corresponds 
to a widening of universality when somethjfi ng has passed - assimilated, 
transformed, recreated, whatever be the case - from one to the other. That means 
that a communication - at least some kind of communication - has been 
established. And this is related to a question at stake in the debates of 
contemporary philosophy of science, that of "incommensurability", that is, 
actually , of "incommunicability". Let us stand, anyhow, with the recognition of 
an inherent tendency to universality of all sciences and all knowledges. 
 If such is the case, as we must be convinced, it means that a 
communication must be possible between these various forms of knowledge, 
between these various sciences and these various conceptions of science, 
notwithstanding their systemic character into their respective cultures. And, 
indeed, such a communication has been effective, along the flow of history, from 
some of them to other ones, for these last would be uncomprehensible without the 
first ones, either linearly either through partial borrowings, even if we do not 
always know how to fully evaluate such exchanges.  
 For those who situate themselves in the system of “contemporary 
science ” - it would be improper to call it “western science” for it has been 
constituted from the most varied contributions -, it entails the requirement, if this 
science is wanted to tend towards more universality, to know and to understand 
these other endeavours, parallel or in filiation. We must, to this aim, get over the 
“ignorabimus” of sociological or structural relativisms, and invent the means of 
comprehension, that set bridges from a science and from a culture to another one, 
taking in account the difficulties inherent to any translation.  
 We can well take our starting point from our own perspective, from 
present science and our own cultures, to build universality of science : it is not 
necessary, nor is it wishable, to convert oneself to another point of view - in this, 
indeed, we would never fully succeed. But we can measure precise and detailed 
knowledge of these other conceptions would allow us to understand to which 
extent present science is universal and, as well, what is still missing in it to 
pretend to universality. Such is, eventually, from the point of view of ethics and of 
rationality as well, the stake of historical study of these cultural forms sciences 
are.  
 I let aside today problem of integration - and first of compatibility - of 
science, or of what we think in science is universal, with the various cultures that 
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are the true wealth of present mankind. Cultures are not fixed and rigid. They 
themselves can be transformed in part by their confrontation with science and, in 
turn, we can expect that, far fom uniformization, each of these cultures is able to 
enrich our conceptions of the science and culture problem and to reequilibrate 
their relationship by offering more genuine ways of acculturating science.  
 The idea of universality goes with that of unclosed representation - or 
system. The vision of the world that goes along with the idea of “universal 
science” is that of a world still in its building stage, a world in elaboration. A 
science aiming at this qualification is at the same time content and research ; 
permanently pointing at its own reform, looking for its improvement, it is critical 
and knows that it remains unachieved. There is an obvious link between 
universality and truth, both being incitative and regulative requirements for the 
constitution of knowledge, and both escaping eternally any full achievement and 
possession. As the young mathematician Evariste Galois wrote it, the night before 
his death in a duel : “Science is the work of human mind, that is more fated to 
study than to know, to search the truth than to find it”32. 
 
 
 
 
5.  
TO CONCLUDE 
 
 
 There is, actually, no conclusion, but still questions. But these 
questions no more have the initial simplicity of the crude sketch of two opposed 
and mutually exclusive positions, from which we had started : having given our 
notions the flesh of reality they endow as having been lived through, the questions 
themselves have henceforth suffered transformations. They have evolved from 
purely abstract ones about something like mere ideological symbols to actual 
problems to explore, not endowed a priori with any impossibility and, above all, 
meaningful. 
 Considering methodology, the questions raised by the idea of 
universality of science and its criticism show the need to consider them from both 
points of view of philosophy and of history. Only in that way can these questions 
get their real content or flesh and their deep meaning. From both points of view, 
they become apparent as questions of fact and as questions of right. The questions 
of fact bear on the nature of science and on its relationships with society through 
history up to the present. The questions of right, informed by the lessons of 
criticisms, lead to no other question than the following ones : is the idea of a 
universality of science thinkable ? is a universality of science possible ? Having 
                                                 
32 Evariste Galois, letter to Gabriel Chevalier, june 1832, in Galois [1962]. 
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been able to state them, with the grounded intuition that they have some meaning, 
we have to go deeper inside them, in order to detail the true nature of their 
contents, and to make alive the science we recognize and the kind of universality 
we think right and valuable. This means that we have to continue to think, and 
study, and exchange.  
 Fundamentally, indeed, these questions invite to a renewed dialogue 
between philosophy and history about sciences (and about the history of sciences), 
due to the necessary imbrication of each of these two types of questionning if we 
want to continue to be able to doubt and to inquire with the view of getting at 
some kind of true knowledge, while at the same time establish what kind of truth 
this knowledge has.  
  
 I would like to acknowledge the discussions I had with participants of 
the Conference during the session or privately, as well as the precious dialogue 
with the unknown referee. They have helped me to improve the present text, and 
they are exactly in the spirit in which it has been written : not to present a closed 
account but to stimulate reflexions and exchanges from the various point of views 
and the various cultural origins. 
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RESUME L’IDEE D'UNIVERSALITE DE LA SCIENCE  
  L’idée de l’“universalité de la science” est l'objet, dans les débats actuels, 
des positions les plus opposées selon que l'on se situe du point de vue d'une 
“science idéale” ou de celui d'une “production sociale des sciences”.  Dans le 
premier cas, la science est conçue comme le "noyau dur " de ses propositions et 
de ses résultats à l'époque considérée, et son universalité supposée ignore les 
facteurs qui relativisent ses contenus de connaissance et qui peuvent être aussi 
bien de nature conceptuelle que sociale. A l'inverse, une attention exclusive aux 
aspects sociaux de la production des connaissance scientifiques ignore le 
caractère objectif de ces contenus de connaissance, qui ont trait aussi bien à des 
objets de pensée comme ceux des mathématiques qu'à des phénomènes du monde 
réel, tant physico-biologique qu'humain et social. Ces deux positions extrêmes, 
caricaturales et cependant fréquemment rencontrées, illustrent l'absence ou la 
méconnaissance d'analyses interdisciplinaires entre la philosophie, les sciences 
et l'histoire des sciences. 
 Nous rappellerons tout d'abord quelques éléments des critiques qui sont 
faites contre l'universalité de la science telle que nous la connaissons 
aujourd'hui, et provenant de la philosophie de la connaissance, de l'histoire des 
sciences, de l'histoire et de l'anthropologie. Nous nous proposons ensuite, après 
avoir posé philosophiquement le problème de  l'universalité de la science, de 
confronter cette idée, telle qu'elle se présente aux différents étapes de l'histoire 
de la pensée, et en particulier de nos jours dans les discussions philosophiques 
et scientifiques, avec la réalité historique de la production, de la diffusion et de 
l'assimilation de la connaissance scientifique conçue selon ses différentes 
dimensions (incluant ses applications et ses liens aux techniques et à la 
technologie). 
 
 
